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Introduction
Sociologists define social capital as the social networks, norms, cooperation and trusts created by human interactions in a community (see e.g., Putnam, 1995 and 2000) . Accordingly, community engagement, e.g., voter turnout at referenda or membership in a non-profit organization, generates positive externalities. Conventional economic theory suggests that social interactions play a role in repeated games (Abreu, 1988) , contract theory (Arrow, 1972) , and solving free rider problems (Greif, 1993) . Studies have found that communities with higher social capital enjoy higher economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997) and greater judicial efficiency and lower corruption (LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shliefer and Vishny, 1997).
More recently, Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote (2002) contend that decisions to optimally invest in social capital (as in human capital) are determined by individuals, and individual social capital formation is then aggregated up to the community-level. In their framework of economic behaviors, an individual maximizes the returns to his investment in social capital; such investment decision is determined by the socio-economic characteristics of that individual. For instance, homeownership increases neighborhood social capital investment because homeowners face high real estate transaction costs (which reduces mobility) and have a financial incentive to increase their property value (see also DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1998) . Furthermore, the return to social capital investment depreciates when one moves out of a community; thus, mobility reduces the individual's investment in social capital of a community. 1 In this paper, we empirically assess the role of individual social capital formation characteristics on household default and bankruptcy outcomes. We estimate a Cox proportional hazard model using a loan-level monthly panel data of more than 170,000 credit cardholders over a 1 Frequent mobility also weakens social connection (see e.g., Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999) and reduces reputational concerns (see e.g., Buckley and Brinig, 2000) .
24-month period. In our data, we observe a borrower's default and bankruptcy filing status in each month over our sample period as well as a borrower's socio-economic characteristics (e.g., age, marital status and homeownership status). In addition, we also have information that enables us to control for important financial distress factors that are predicted to drive a borrower into default to bankruptcy, such as a borrower's "riskiness", spending, debt, income, wealth as well as economic conditions and legal environment. Moreover, our data is also unique in that there's information about an individual's current county of residence and his state of birth (or state of immigration entry for foreign born), allowing us to identify mobility for each borrower. Thus, in addition to age, marital status as well as homeownership status, our individual social capital formation characteristics also include: whether a borrower still lives in his "state of birth"; the distance in miles between his state of residence and state of birth; and whether a borrower has migrated to a rural area.
Based on the individual social capital formation economic model of Gleaser, Laibson and Sacerdote (2002) , we expect the risk of default or bankruptcy to be lower for a borrower who has greater incentive to invest in social capital.
Previewing the results, our findings indicate that living in worsening local unemployment condition and in a state without health insurance coverage play a statistically and economically significant role in consumer default and bankruptcy. Moreover, we also find that credit risk deterioration, lower income and wealth status, as well as higher spending, APR or debt significantly increases a borrower's risk of defaulting on his debt or declaring bankruptcy. Overall, these financial distress factors of consumer default or bankruptcy risk are documented in Domowitz and Sartain (1999) , Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook (2000) , Gross and Souleles (2002) and in the quantitative theoretical model of Chatterjee, Corbae, Nakajima and Rios-Rull (2007) .
After controlling for an individual's credit risk score, spending, debt, income and wealth as well as macroeconomic conditions and legal variations across states, we find that individual social capital formation characteristics can significantly explain consumer bankruptcy and default outcomes. First, we find that the risk of bankruptcy and default is higher for an individual who migrates out of his state of birth. For example, an individual who continues to live in his state of birth is 9 percent less likely to default on his credit card debt and 13 percent less likely to file for bankruptcy, while an individual who moves 325 miles from his state of birth is 26 percent more likely to default and 28 percent more likely to declare bankruptcy. Furthermore, compared to individuals who move to an urban area, those who move to a rural area are 9 and 7 percent less likely to default and declare bankruptcy, respectively. These results are consistent with our expectation based on the individual social capital formation economic model by Glaeser et al (2002) .
Furthermore, we also find that defaults and bankruptcies rise and then fall over the lifecycle.
Equally important, a borrower who is married is 24 percent less likely to default on his credit card debt and 32 percent less likely to file for bankruptcy. Finally, an individual who owns a home is 17 and 25 percent less likely to, respectively, default and file for bankruptcy.
Our findings may also have some implications for the ongoing debate surrounding the rise in consumer bankruptcy over the past almost two decades. Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook (2000) show evidence of two major causes of the recent increase in bankruptcy filings in the US: increases in credit card and mortgage debt; and unexpected adverse events (such as unemployment, divorce, health problems, medical debts) have reduced the ability of households to repay their debt and eventually compel them to file for bankruptcy.
2 Despite such compelling evidence, many contend that increases in debt and adverse income or spending shocks cannot entirely explain the rise in consumer bankruptcy over the past almost two decades. Buckley and Brinig (1998) at the state-level and predictions in the equilibrium bankruptcy model of Livshits, MacGee and Tertilt (2007) .
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After controlling for a borrower's credit riskiness, spending, debt, income, and wealth as well as legal and economic environments, our study may provide additional insights to the role of social stigma on consumer bankruptcy. Mobility weakens an individual's investment in social capital (DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1998; Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote, 2002) and reduces reputational concerns (Buckley and Brinig, 2000) , while rural areas or small town communities have stronger social norms due to homogeneity (Alesina and LaFerrara, 2000) and face higher cost of 3 Gropp, Scholz and White (1997) also show that debtors are more likely to file for bankruptcy and repay less in bankruptcy as bankruptcy exemption level rises. They also argue that the exemption laws provide partial wealth insurance and the insurance coverage rises with the exemption levels. See also Agarwal, Liu, and Mielnicki (2003) and Agarwal, Chomsisengphet, Liu, and Mielnicki (2005) for empirical evidence on the impact of bankruptcy exemptions on, respectively, consumer and small business bankruptcy. 4 However, in the model of Arthreya (2004), a decline in social stigma cannot explain the simultaneous increase in both debt and bankruptcy. Athreya (2004) and Livshits, MacGee and Tertilt (2007) also attribute the recent increase in bankruptcy filing to lower transaction cost of lending.
social connection due to greater distance (Galeser and Sacerdote, 2000) . These individual socioeconomic characteristics collectively can affect the strength of social networks and norms in a community and in turn shape the degree of a community's attitude towards certain behaviors or outcomes. In this study, we show the explanatory significance of an individual's social capital formation characteristics on his propensity to default on his debt or file for bankruptcy, ceteris paribus. Such characteristics can in turn influence a community to attach social stigma to personal bankruptcy and default.
A parallel study which directly assesses the impact of state-level social capital characteristics on aggregate consumer bankruptcy is that of Buckley and Brinig (1998) Finally, our paper also contributes to the literature studying the impact of social capital on household financial decision-making. Madrian and Shea (2001) find that an individual's decision to participate in a particular employer-sponsored retirement plan is influenced by the choices of their co-workers. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2004) find that Italian households in regions with higher social capital are more likely to use formal credit channels, such as writing more checks and investing in stocks. Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004) show that people who attend church and interact with their neighbors are more likely to invest in the stock market.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes our data and empirical methodology.
Section 4 discusses the empirical results, and section 5 concludes.
Data and Methodology

Data
We use a proprietary 24-month panel dataset from a large financial institution that issues credit cards nationally. There are several unique and important features of this data set that enables us to test the impact of individual social capital variables on consumer bankruptcy and default. This data set includes a representative sample of more than 170,000 individual credit card accounts that were issued between January 1997 and June 2000. for the rest of the paper, whenever we refer to an account being 90-days delinquent (i.e., default), we do include accounts that declared bankruptcy prior to being delinquent. Furthermore, accounts with a flag indicating lost, stolen, never active, closed due to fraud/death status are excluded from the analysis.
We also have additional important information that has been found to predict default or bankruptcy outcomes, such as the cardholder's monthly credit limit, spending balance, credit card debt as well as other debt (which includes mortgage, home equity or auto balance). We also know each cardholder's credit bureau risk score (FICO score), which is updated quarterly over the twoyear period. Furthermore, the data also contains other important information at the time of account origination, such as his personal income and wealth category (low, medium and high).
Equally important, our data also contains key information given by a borrower at the time of application that enables us to construct the individual social capital variables as outlined by Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote (2002) . If the credit cardholder has a spouse listed on the application, then we code her as married. Borrower age is determined from the birth date of the applicant.
Homeownership is determined if the applicant has a mortgage balance reported at the credit bureau at the time of the credit card application. Based on the first three digits of the consumer's social security number, the state of birth of the applicant (and state of immigration entry for foreign born)
can be identified. 6 Since we also know the zip code at which the consumer currently lives, we create an indicator variable denoting that the consumer still lives in his "state of birth"; calculate the distance moved between state of birth and the currently reside zip code centroid (Distance Moved) 7 ;
and create an indicator variable denoting that the consumer moved to a rural area 8 .
To control for macroeconomic shocks and legal environments, we augment our loan-level data with county unemployment rate, as well as state-level demographics such as percentage of the state population without medical coverage. 9 We also augment our data with state legal variables such as homestead and personal property exemption levels as well as garnishment rates. Since we do not know as to the exact date of the move to the current state, one potential reason for the move could be forum shopping for a potential bankruptcy filer -take advantage of the lenient exemption levels in the new state (Elul and Subramanian, 2002) . Therefore, we include the change in the homestead and property exemptions levels, and the change in garnishment rates between a borrower's state of birth and the state which he currently lives in.
Methodology
Let D i,t = 1 to indicate an account i in bankruptcy or default in month t. Our data is a monthly discrete-time panel such that if, for example, the account becomes 90-days delinquent or the borrower files for bankruptcy in month 18, then D i,t = 0 for the first 17 months and D i,18 = 1, and the rest of the observations will drop out of the sample thereafter. 10 We estimate the conditional probability that D i = 1 at time t, given that the consumer is current from the start of the performance period up to time t-1.
We estimate the following Cox proportional hazard model:
(latitude/1000000)*( π /180) Distance between two points, with both points' longitudes and latitudes in radians = arccos(sin(lat1)*sin(lat2)+cos(lat1)*cos(lat2)*cos(lon2-lon1))*6370*0.62 8 We used the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) definition. 9 We also tried to control for state divorce rates; however, four states (California, Colorado, Indiana, and Louisiana) do not report divorce rate information whereas two other states (Nevada and Texas) do not have a complete time series for the time period covered in our study (see www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss.htm). As discussed in the robustness section, including state divorce rates (without the six states) in our estimation, and our results remain the qualitatively similar. 10 This common form of incomplete data is defined as right censored. Accordingly, all customers start at time t=0 and a customer could drop out of the sample because they close the account in good standing or even stay current till the end of three years without being delinquent or declaring bankruptcy. We do not consider left censoring in our analysis (accounts that have already been delinquent or declared bankruptcy even before the observation of time begins).
i t h t X represents the probability the an individual will default on his credit debt or file for bankruptcy in month t+1, conditional on "surviving" up to month t-1. The baseline hazard function at month t is represented by 0 ( ) h t , which does not take any specific functional form. The vector , i t X is comprised of time-varying as well as time-constant covariates as follows: DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1998) . Hence, the vector SC i also includes an indicator variable denoting that the borrower is a homeowner, and another indicator variable denoting that the borrower is married. We expect the risk of default and bankruptcy to be lower for a debtor who owns a home or who is married.
Moreover, the vector SC i also captures mobility of a borrower: an indicator variable denoting that the borrower still lives in his state of birth, the distance the borrower has moved from his state of birth, and an indicator variable denoting that he moved to a rural area. Glaeser et al (2002) argue that the return to social capital investment depreciates when one moves out of a community; thus, mobility reduces the individual's social capital investment in a community. Frequent mobility also weakens social connection (see e.g., Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999; Putnam, 2000) and reduces reputational concerns (see e.g., Buckley and Brinig, 2000) . Hence, we expect the risk of default or bankruptcy to be lower for a borrower who continues to live in this state of birth or who moves to a rural area, and we expect the risk of default or bankruptcy to be higher with greater distance of mobility.
Empirical Results
Cumulative Hazard Function
We Except for borrower age, the cumulative hazard functions indicate that default/bankruptcy rate is higher across account tenure for borrowers with individual social-economic characteristics that are predicted by Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote (2002) to have weaker incentive to invest in social capital. With respect to borrower age, the youngest (30 years or younger) and oldest (60 years or older) group of consumers has the lowest bankruptcy risk, while the middle age group of consumers has the highest rate of bankruptcy (Figure 1 ). This pattern is inconsistent to our expectation -that is, we expect lower risk of bankruptcy for the young and higher for the elders given greater incentive to invest in social capital in the early stage of life and weaker incentive to invest in social capital in the later stage of life.
As expected, homeowners have a lower bankruptcy rate than non-homeowners across account tenure (Figure 2) , and married consumers also have a lower bankruptcy rate than single consumers (Figure 3) . Moreover, Figure 4 indicates that a consumer who continues to live in his state of birth have lower bankruptcy risk, while a borrower who moved out of his state of birth has a higher bankruptcy risk. Figure 5 compares the cumulative hazard function by the distance of mobility. We categorize the distance moved into percentile. Consumers who moved from their state of birth but are within relatively closer proximity to their state of birth (below the 10 th percentile distance) have lower bankruptcy risk, while consumers who move farther from their state of birth (above the 90 th percentile distance) are more likely to file for bankruptcy. Furthermore, consumers who moved to a rural area have a lower rate of bankruptcy that those who move to an urban area (see Figure 6 ), which we define using the Metropolitan Statistical Area definition. Before discussing the impact of social capital on bankruptcy and default, we first confer the impact of vital financial distress factors such as borrower riskiness, spending, debt, income, wealth as well as economic and legal environments on default or bankruptcy.
Semi-Parametric Estimation Results
Our results indicate that the risk of credit card default or bankruptcy is significantly higher for consumers living in a county with higher unemployment rate 11 as well as in a state with higher fraction of its population with no health insurance. Holding all other covariates at their mean value, a 1-percentage point increase in the county unemployment rate implies a 10 basis points increase in the likelihood of a borrower filing for bankruptcy. Equally important, the fraction of state population without health care coverage has a significantly positive but non-linear effect on bankruptcy (see other covariates constant at their mean value. However, the negative relationship between FICO score and bankruptcy seems to be non-linear (see Figure 9 ), suggesting that the same 10-point drop of a FICO score of the less credit worthy borrowers (e.g., those with FICO ≤ 620) implies a larger increase in the risk of bankruptcy than the same point drop in the FICO score of the more credit worthy borrowers (e.g., those with FICO ≥ 740). For example, the bankruptcy risk of a borrower whose FICO score declines from 600 to 580 jumps 46 basis points, while the bankruptcy risk of a borrower whose FICO score drops from 800 to 780 increases only 13 basis points.
Moreover, we also find that cardholders having lower credit limit but higher interest charges (APR), spending or debt (on this credit card) are more likely to default or file for bankruptcy. The risk of bankruptcy is 7 basis points higher when a borrower's APR increase from 15 to 25 percent and 32 basis points higher when the borrower's debt increases from $1000 to $5000 (see Figure 10 ).
The explanatory significance of credit card debt and APR on consumer default and bankruptcy is consistent with evidence found in Domowitz and Sartain (1999) and documented in Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook (2000) . On the other hand, our results also indicate that borrowers with higher other debt (including auto, mortgage and home equity credit) are significantly less likely to default on his this credit card debt and less likely to file for bankruptcy.
Finally, we turn to the impact of individual social capital characteristics on consumer bankruptcy or default outcomes. First, we find that credit card default and bankruptcy varies over the lifecycle -that is, the likelihood of default or bankruptcy rises with age in the early stage of life but then declines with age in the later stage of life (see Figure 11 ). While this inverted U-shaped pattern of bankruptcy rate over the lifecycle is inconsistent with our expectation based on the social capital formation framework of Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote (2002) , it is consistent with the pattern depicted in Livshits, MacGee and Tertilt (2006) . In addition, cardholder who owns a home or is married is 17 and 24 percent, respectively, less likely to default on his credit card, and is 25 and 32 percent, respectively, less likely to declare bankruptcy. These results are consistent with findings in Domowitz and Sartain (1999) .
Moreover, we find that a cardholder who continues to live in his state of birth has a 14 percent lower probability of defaulting on his credit card debt and a 10 percent lower probability of declaring bankruptcy. Meanwhile, an individual who moves 325 miles from his state of birth is 26 percent more likely to default on his debt and 28 percent more likely to file for bankruptcy (see Figure 12 ). Finally, an individual moving to a rural area is 9 percent less likely to default on his debt and 7 percent less likely to file for bankruptcy. Given that the return to social capital investment declines with mobility (Glaeser, Laibson and Sacerdote, 2002) , weakens social connection (see e.g., Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1999; Putnam, 2000) and reduces reputational concerns (see e.g., Buckley and Brinig, 2000) , these results are consistent with our expectation based on the individual social capital formation economic model -that is, the risk of default or bankruptcy is lower for a borrower who has greater incentive to invest in social capital.
Extensions and Robustness
Despite controlling for borrower credit worthiness, credit limit, APR, spending, debt, income, wealth as well as macroeconomic and legal environments, the explanatory significance of our individual social capital formation characteristics may be picking up the impact of other socioeconomic characteristics that are not included in our model, such as characteristics of people within each zip code that may also affect credit card default and personal bankruptcy. To address such concern, we estimated our model with zip code fixed effects (dropping state fixed effects). The results are shown in Table 3 and remain qualitatively consistent with those in Table 2 , in which we used state fixed effects.
We also conducted exhaustive robustness checks on our analysis. First, we estimated the survival model with varying lag structure to alleviate any concerns that our results might be biased towards a particular lag length. Second, we also tried including state divorce rates (dropping three states that do not report divorce rate statistics). Third, we also tried including homestead and personal property exemption levels as well as garnishment rates (instead of the difference between the those of the borrower's state of birth and his state of residence as used in Table 2 and Table 3 ), dropping the state dummy variables since they do not very over time. Overall, the re-estimation results remain qualitatively consistent with the results being reported in Tables 2 and 3 .
State-level Social Capital and Household Bankruptcy
To further assess whether there's a connection between social capital and consumer bankruptcy at the community-level, we assess the correlation between Putnam's aggregate social capital index (Putnam 2000) and state bankruptcy filing rate in 2000. 12 Putnam develops a social capital index based on 13 different measures of social capital like -membership in voluntary associations, attendance at club meetings, turnout at presidential elections, trust among individuals, and philanthropic generosity (among others).
We find a negative correlation of 0.4356 between Putnam's social capital index and state bankruptcy index. We find that states that are ranked higher on Putnam's social capital index (e.g., Vermont and Minnesota) have lower bankruptcy filing rate, while states that are ranked lower on the social capital index (e.g., Georgia and Tennessee) have higher bankruptcy rate (see Figure 13 ). We also regressed the state bankruptcy rates on Putnam's social capital index, controlling for the state's economic and legal characteristics. Table 4 reports the OLS regression results. We find that a 1-point increase in the SCI results in a 0.3 points reduction in the state bankruptcy rate.
Conclusion
An individual's decision to maximize his investment in social capital is determined by his socio-economic characteristics (Glaeser, Laibson and Sarcerdote, 2002) . In this paper, we empirically test the role of individual social capital formation characteristics on personal bankruptcy and default outcomes in the consumer credit market. After controlling for a borrower's riskiness, spending, debt, income, wealth as well as legal and economic environments, we find that individual social capital formation characteristics such as mobility, rural residency, homeownership, marital status, and borrower age play a statistically and economically significant role on consumer bankruptcy and defaults outcomes. These individual social capital formation characteristics collectively can affect the strength of a community's social networks and norms, and in turn shape 12 The state bankruptcy rate per capita comes from the Administrative Office of the US Courts and the US Bureau of the Census, and is ranked to construct state bankruptcy index.
the degree of a community's attitude towards certain socio-economic behaviors or outcomes.
Therefore, the explanatory significance of an individual's social capital formation characteristics on his need to default on his debt or to file for bankruptcy could perhaps provide additional insights to the role of social stigma on consumer bankruptcy.
Our study also has some direct policy implications. (2000) and Gross and Souleles (2002) . Hence, without effective policies to also ensure health care coverage, stimulate local economic growth and uphold real wage increase, tightening bankruptcy laws could have feeble impact on reducing bankruptcy filings. 
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